A.1. Summary Statistics & Balance Tests
.0 below provides basic summary statistics for the data used in this paper. The mean value of percent male is 0.509. Figure A .0 further shows that the distribution of percent male in the data is consistent with luck, as described in Section 5.6 of the paper.
Next, Table A .1 shows that percent male is largely balanced across a variety of region characteristics, including urban density in 1000, which is a measure of pre-existing economic development; state age in 1000, and whether the region was ruled by Romans, Carolingians or Muslims, which together may proxy for existing levels of state institutions; and geographic measures such as whether the region is on the Atlantic coast, and overall climatic variation (the number of degree-days that the average temperature deviates from room temperature); existing levels of institutionalization, as indicated by whether the region used elections to select its monarchs in 1000, and whether it had pagan tribes in 1000. The data for are described in more detail in the note below the table. 
A.2. Environmental Factors & Sex Ratios
One critique of our main finding in column (5) of Table 1 is that the sex ratio of children is endogenous to a social or environmental traits of the region. While this may be plausible given the fact that a large literature in demography has showed that sex ratios at birth are affected by environmental or parental characteristics, we present evidence here casting doubt on the concern that it is heavily influencing our results. Before presenting this evidence, we note that the children of monarchs in all regions, even poor ones, were likely to have had access to very high absolute levels of nutrition and attention by the standards of the time. Conditional on being a monarch, we suspect that regional differences in the immediate biological environment of rulers in different regions should be small. Moreover, the effects of environmental factors on sex ratios found in the demography literature tend to be very small, and owe their discovery to the very large datasets common in this literature. Relative to the effects found in the demography literature, the differences we 
% Male Differences in Various Studies
Figure A.1. Bars represent observed differences between the proportion male in treatment and control groups in selected studies. Visaria (1967) , for instance, found that the percent of male births was .514 for whites and .507 for blacks, giving a treatment effect of .007. Other determinants are season (Lyster, 1971) , gender of the previous child (Malinvaud, 1955) , family size (Malinvaud, 1955) , the calamity of World War II (MacMahon and Pugh, 1954) , smoking (James, 1987) , twin births (Jacobsen et al., 1999) , paternal age (Jacobsen et al., 1999) , the calamity caused by the September 11th terrorist attacks (Catalano et al., 2006) , and the stress of German re-unification (Catalano, 2003) . The bars on the right shows the comparable figure for our percent male variable, comparing percent male for the poorest and richest quartiles using our measure of GDP per capita, adjusted for PPP, and averaged between 2007-09.
find between rich and poor regions are extremely large, as shown in Figure A .1. The figure shows the effect sizes of various environmental factors, events or family/parental traits on the percent of male births from previous studies, as well as the differences between the top and bottom quartiles of modern regional GDP per capita in the percent male variable of this paper (see the note below the figure) . The economic stress of the German re-unification, for instance, caused the ratio of male births to increase by .004. World War II, a calamitous event, had an even smaller effect on the precent of male births in Europe. The difference in our percent male variable between the richest and poorest quartiles of European regions, by contrast, is .047. We take these comparisons to indicate that any pre-existing difference in the ratio of male children is probably too small to be driving our results. Note: Logistic regressions of the decision to have the k + 1th child on the fraction of males among the first k children. Standard errors in parentheses.
A.3. Male-Preferred Stopping Rules
Another concern with our approach is that the sex ratios of royal children are the product of male-preferred fertility stopping rules within families. We showed in Table 1 of the paper that such stopping rules are not affecting our results by showing that the percent of firstborn children that are male also has a significant and sizable effect on contemporary development. Since the sex of the firstborn child is also an indicator (albeit an imperfect one) of the likelihood of that male heirs are available, but cannot be affect by any kind of stopping rule, this shows that our results are not driven by any biases created by gender-related stopping rules. We also argue that the effects of percent male that we estimate are also unlikely to be affected by a male-preferred stopping rule. The concern is that because monarchs had strong incentives to continue their dynasties, it is plausible that they would keep having children until they had sufficiently many boys, skewing the distribution of the sex ratio within a family. Within a nuclear family, it is possible that such stopping rules have large effects on the sex ratio averaged across families. In larger populations, however, the effect of such stopping rules can only have a small effect on the population sex ratio, so long as the probability of producing a boy is constant across couples. This fact is a basic result in mathematical demography (Keyfitz et al., 2005) . Without sexselective abortions that directly affect the underlying probability of male births, any stopping rule would merely change the distribution of boys and girls across nuclear families, with some parents keeping their families small after having a boy and others having many girls in order to have a boy. This is why we construct the percent male measure by calculating proportion of male children among all children of monarchs over the five-hundred-year period of our study, rather than averaging percent male across nuclear families. Furthermore, it is unlikely that male-preferred stopping rules are affecting our results since under a male-preferred stopping Note: OLS estimates of the effect of percent male on Log of GDP per capita using the medieval polity as the unit of analysis. Since medieval borders are changing, we define these polities at snapshots of 100 year intervals. Standard errors in parentheses.
rule, the fraction of male children within a family (or in a small population of families) should be negatively correlated with family size (Keyfitz et al., 2005 ), but we have no evidence of this in our data. In fact, the fraction of legitimate male children in a polity is actually positively correlated with the average number of legitimate children of rulers in the 500 year period of our study, with a correlation coefficient of +0.34. Finally, Table A .2 shows very limited evidence for the any kind of sex-dependent stopping rule. The likelihood that a medieval European monarch has a second child when the first one is male is lower than when the first one is female, but after the first child there is no discernible effect of the sex ratio among the first k children on the choice to have the k + 1th child, except at k = 4. We take this as additional evidence that stopping rules are probably not seriously influencing our estimates of percent male's effect on contemporary development. Table A .3 shows that our results are largely robust to redefining the unit of our analysis to be the medieval polity by choosing the political boundaries at the turn of each century in the five hundred year period of our analysis. A "medieval polity in year 1000," for example, consists of the area that was ruled by a particular ruler in year 1000. We computed contemporary GDP per capita for such polities by taking a population weighted average of GDP per capita across modern regions spanned by these polities. Again, our coding is not perfect because some modern regions that we discarded were divided among medieval rulers.
A.4. Alternative Units of Analysis
In yet an alternative approach, we show that are results are largely similar when we use "treatment units" as our units of analysis. We define a treatment unit to be the largest cluster of geographically contiguous NUTS regions for which the percent male variable does not vary. 
A.5. Other Specifications & Samples
In Tables A.4 and A.5 we present the results of various additional robustness checks. Table  A .4 shows that our results are largely robust to removing various groups of macro-polities from the specification in column (5) of Table 1 in the main text. This tests the possibility that differing regional development trajectories (in particular between Eastern and Western Europe and Northern and Southern Europe) may affect the resultst the same time, the table reveals that removing polities in Eastern Europe does weaken our results: the effect size shrinks and is measured with greater imprecision. This is likely due to a combination of reduced power and because inheritance norms were weakest in Eastern Europe; therefore the effect of male heirs or their absence should be greater in the east than in the west. 1 We note that column (5) removes most of the regions east of the Elbe, which speaks to the literature that hypothesizes divergent regional political trajectories between Eastern and Western Europe (see for instance Brenner (1976) , Ertman (1997) , Chirot (1991) and Braudel (1982) ). If we got rid of all of the regions Note: OLS estimates of the effect of percent male on Log of GDP per capita under alternative samples and specifications. Column (1) returns the seven omitted regions in the Czech Republic and Poland to the baseline sample. Columns (2), (3) and (4) vary the 200 year cutoff described in Section 4 to 100, 300 and 400 years, respectively. Column (5) removes all regions that were ever ruled by a non-Christian monarch. Column (6) removes regions containing modern country capitals. Column (7) recomputes percent male after removing the children of monarchs who came to power through a coup and were not members of the ruling dynasty. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the macro-polity level in square brackets. Block bootstrapped standard errors in curly brackets.
Column (1) of Table A .5 shows that our results hold not just across the borders of modern states, but also within them. This column reports our estimate of the effect of percent male on contemporary development when we introduce country dummies to our baseline specification. Here, the estimated effect of percent male diminishes to approximately one fifth of its effect without the country dummies, but is still significant at the 10% level. However, it is important to note that this estimate almost certainly suffers from post-treatment bias, primarily because the political map of Europe changed frequently and very dramatically even after 1500 and these changes might be correlated with region characteristics in ways that bias our results. Column (2) adds the seven omitted regions from Poland and the Czech Republic to our baseline sample. Columns (3), (4) and (5) vary the 200 year cutoff that defines the baseline sample to 100, 300 and 400 years. Column (6) removes the capitals of modern regions. The estimates from this specification probably also suffer from post-treatment bias since becoming the capital of a region may be linked to percent male, as in the case of Paris. In column (7), we recompute percent male after removing the children of monarchs who came to power through a coup and were not members of the dynasty that was in place and use this recomputed measure of the independent variable in the baseline specification. In column (8), we remove the seven years of the black death (1347-1353) from our region-years.
specifically, then the coefficient estimate would be 5.113 (s.e. = 1.185, macro-polity clustered s.e. = 3.631, block bootstrapped s.e. = 3.005, N = 97, R 2 = 0.164).
A.6. Multiple Male Heirs
One might think that having multiple legitimate male heirs may lead these heirs to conflict over succession, resulting in more destructive conflict, weaker states and weaker development outcomes. To examine this possibility, we test the hypothesis that increasing the fraction of monarchs with multiple legitimate male heirs at the expense of the fraction of monarchs with only one legitimate male heir (i.e., holding fixed the fraction of monarchs with only no legitimate male heirs at the time of their death) is harmful for development. Specifically, we estimate the following model by OLS:
Log GDP per capita j = β 0 + β 1 Zero Heirs j + β 2 More than one Heir j + ε j where Zero Heirs j is the fraction of monarchs of region j that had zero legitimate male heirs at the time of death or replacement, More than one Son j is the fraction of monarchs of region j that had multiple legitimate male heirs at the time of death or replacement, and ε j is the error term. The hypothesis is that β 2 ≤ 0. We can soundly reject this hypothesis: the OLS estimate of β 2 is 2.208 (s.e. = 0.647, macro-polity clustered s.e = 1.220, block bootstrapped
s.e. = 1.422, N = 114, R 2 = 0.177). 
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List of Regions by Medieval Dynastic Unit
Note: "Dynastic unit" refers to the unit of territories under a single ruler in a given year. It often takes its name from a political unit with which the ruling family was closely associated ("England, "France") though it often includes territories that were not contiguous with the titular unit, and had no constitutional association with that unit other than their common ruler (e.g. Aquitaine as part of England). In some cases ("Hapsburg") the ruler was not closely linked to a single territory, so the dynasty name (or dynasty branch) has been used. In some cases, a region was part of a unit for several non-contiguous periods. 
